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outside to be a multi-millenial stand-off does not inspire confidence that philosophy alone has the resources to resolve the problem.
In light of these data points about the history of the problem(s) of free will and its persistence, I am inclined to think that perhaps the most interesting recent development in this debate has to do with the introduction of experimental methods to it, and along with it, the re-introduction of the opinions of non-philosophers to these issues. A number of philosophers and psychologists have taken to studying what "the folk" -people not trained in the philosophical debates on these subjects -have to say about free will and the conditions under which they are willing to ascribe freedom and responsibility.
The limits and importance of experimentally-informed philosophy remains a subject of contention between philosophers. The promise of such work, though, is relatively clear: minimally, experimental methods might provide us with principled and measurable ways to assess some aspects of thought that are rooted in comparatively easily accessible levels of reflection. One interesting result of recent work in this vein, especially that of Shaun Nichols and his sometimes collaborator Joshua Knobe, suggests that, contra compatibilists, incompatibilism really is rooted in aspects of ordinary thinking, but contra incompatibilists and some of the folk, compatibilism too is rooted in common sense.
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In what follows, I consider the philosophical implications of this research in two parts. First, I will raise some minor questions about the methodology. Second, and primarily, I focus on what the truth of this data and its interpretation would mean for philosophical debates about free will.
The experimental work
Nichols maintains that there are two clear results in the experimental work he discusses: (1) we have incompatibilist intuitions under some conditions and (2) we have compatibilist intuitions under others.
